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COURTS 
In Medina, the Prophet Muḥammad acted as an arbiter within the early community 
(ummah). His role was sanctioned by the Qurʾān, which prescribed that he judge according 
to the divine revelation (5:48–49). After his death in 632, the first caliphs took over his role 
and dispensed justice in Medina. The date when the first judge (qāḍī) was delegated is still 
the subject of controversy. Reports that the Prophet himself sent judges to Yemen are 
rejected by modern scholarship. According to Islamic sources, the second caliph, ʿUmar 
(r. 634–644), appointed qāḍīs in conquered territories soon after the beginning of the 
conquest. Although the status of these first judges and of their legal rulings is unclear, the 
first Muslim armies certainly needed men appointed by an authority to arbitrate the 
inevitable conflicts among the soldiers. However, because of the contradictory sources, 
some scholars dismiss these reports and defer the appearance of the first judiciary system 
until the reign of Muʿāwiyah (r. 661–680). 
 
The Sharīʿah Court  
One judge alone dispensed justice in every large Muslim city, except in a capital such as 
Baghdad, which from the late eighth century was divided into three districts and from the 
eleventh century on into four districts. In the aftermath of the conquest, only cities with 
Friday mosques had a qāḍī. As an increasing number of conquered peoples converted to 
Islam, especially from the ninth century on, jurisdictions were created in secondary towns, 
where the judge was usually a deputy (nāʾib) of the qāḍī of a larger city. Judgeships were 
held exclusively by adult Muslim males of unsullied reputation. 
The main task of the qāḍī was to dispense justice between litigants. During the classical 
period, he sat in a public place, usually the mosque (some qāḍīs preferred holding court in 
their home), where a plaintiff could come and lodge a complaint against an adversary. If 
the defendant refused to appear, the judge could summon him and even have him forcibly 
brought. If the defendant did not confess his guilt, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove 
his claim by providing at least two honorable witnesses (a process known as bayyinah, or 
testimonial proof). Alternatively, Medinan doctrine would accept one witness if the 
plaintiff took an oath. If there were no witnesses (or if the witnesses were not reliable), the 
judge would ask the defendant to swear that he was innocent. Ḥanafīs regarded the 
defendant’s refusal to take an oath as a proof of his culpability. However, according to 
Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs, the defendant’s decline to swear was no proof and in this situation the 
judge had to refer the oath to the plaintiff. Some circumstantial evidence could also be 
taken into consideration in favor of the defendant, on the word of an expert (Johansen, 
2002, “Signs as Evidence,” p. 174). On the basis of this legal evidence, the judge then 
issued a written and binding decision, which could only be repealed if there were a serious 
breach of law. The judge was assisted in his task by one or more clerks and by a body of 
professional witnesses—these first appeared in Egypt at the turn of the ninth century, and 
thereafter this custom seems to have spread to other provinces. With the help of other 
assistants, the qāḍī also performed “administrative” tasks, such as the supervision of 
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endowed foundations (waqfs) and the control of the property of orphaned, disabled, or 
bankrupt people.  
 
Relationships with the Rulers 
From the very beginning of Islam, justice was the prerogative of the ruler. He delegated 
his judicial authority to qāḍīs, who were appointed for an indeterminate length of time. At 
any moment, the ruler could dismiss them and appoint other judges in their place. The qāḍī 
received a salary and was therefore considered a civil servant. 
Under the Umayyads (661–750), who ruled from Syria, provincial governors were 
usually responsible for the appointment of their qāḍīs. Although some Umayyad caliphs, 
such as ʿUmar II (r. 717–720), Yazīd II (r. 720–724), and Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 
724–743), attempted to overrule the authority of some governors by appointing provincial 
qāḍīs themselves, centralization of the judgeship under the authority of the caliph was only 
completed under the ʿAbbāsids. The second ʿAbbāsid caliph, al-Manṣūr (r. 754–775), 
began to appoint judges in the principal Iraqi cities, and later in the provinces. This reform 
was part of a larger political agenda that was meant to reinforce central power, the main 
symbolic expression of which was the foundation of the round city of Madīnat al-Salām 
(Baghdad) in 762. Provincial governors did not easily accept the undermining of their 
power, however, and attempts were made to regain control of the judiciary, especially 
when the central power was at its most vulnerable (as, e.g., during and after the civil war 
between the caliphs al-Amīn and his brother al-Maʾmūn, in 811–813). On the whole, 
ʿAbbāsid control of the qāḍīs became widely accepted except in territories where the 
caliph was not recognized, as in al-Andalus (Muslim Spain, where a dynasty of Umayyad 
governors came to power in 756). The clearest representation of the centralization of the 
judiciary was the creation of the office of chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt, literally, judge of 
judges) in Baghdad around 790, under the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–809). Although 
the chief judge rarely appointed other qāḍīs himself, he was a close advisor of the caliph, 
and he had a decisive influence on the selection of judges. In al-Andalus, the judge of 
Córdoba, who had held the title of qāḍī al-jamāʿah (judge of the community) since the 
beginning of the Umayyad rule, tended to be regarded as the western counterpart of the 
qāḍī al-quḍāt.  
From the late ninth century onward, when provinces began to claim political and 
financial autonomy from the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, asserting centralized authority over local 
judgeships became a major issue. With the political decline of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate in the 
early tenth century, the vizier (chief of the central administration) played an increasingly 
important role in the appointment of judges, but after 945, the Būyid amirs soon extended 
their authority over the judiciary. They were replaced in 1055 by a Seljuk sultan who 
claimed the same prerogative over the judgeship, even though the vizier Niẓām al-Mulk 
(d. 1092) acknowledged that the qāḍī was still theoretically a deputy of the caliph. 
The selection of qāḍīs according to their schools of law (sing. madhhab) was also a 
political issue. The ʿAbbāsids selected their first qāḍīs from among the Hejazī jurists, 
perhaps because promoting Medinan law (which relied on ʿamal, the uninterrupted practice 
of the Medinan community since the death of the Prophet) would reinforce their 
legitimacy. From the reign of the caliph al-Mahdī (r. 775–785) onward, the ʿAbbāsids 
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gravitated toward the followers of the Iraqi scholar Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767), the eponym of 
the Ḥanafī school of law, whom they appointed as qāḍīs in the principal regions of the 
empire. This policy met resistance by urban communities who were still attached to their 
local legal traditions. During the ninth century, qāḍīs were increasingly selected for their 
theological beliefs, and the Ḥanafīs lost their hegemony after 871. Thereafter, rulers 
appointed judges mainly from the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Shāfiʿī legal schools (except for the 
Shiite Fāṭimids, r. 909–1171, who preferred Ismāʿīlī qāḍīs), with each dynasty favoring 
one or another of these schools for the chief judgeship. In 1265 the legal pluralism at play 
was formalized under the Mamlūks (1250–1517) when Sultan Baybars appointed four 
chief judges, one for each Sunnī school (Shāfiʿī, Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī), first in 
Cairo and then in Damascus. This reform, which from a legal point of view was quite 
notable, has also been interpreted as a political act undertaken to weaken the authority of a 
single chief judge who had been showing annoying signs of independence. 
 
Tension and Judicial Independence 
Tension between the ruler and the judiciary existed since the Umayyad period. The qāḍī 
was a mere deputy of the ruler and depended on him for the execution of some of his 
judgments. For example, judges had no authority over the prisons in which they 
incarcerated debtors, and local governors or chiefs of police could release prisoners 
without the judge’s consent. Rulers could easily overrule or interfere with the judiciary, 
whereas the qāḍīs, who were hired from among the scholars who were the authors of the 
Islamic jurisprudence, considered themselves the main judicial authority. The 
centralization of legal appointments under the caliph al-Manṣūr allowed judges to be free 
of the authority of local governors, but they were beholden to the caliph, who also 
interfered in the judicial process. 
Under the ʿAbbāsids, qāḍīs became a major political tool. The dynasty had seized 
power by denouncing the impiety and the injustice of the Umayyads. In order to maintain 
their legitimacy, at a time of intense legal development that led to the birth of the classical 
schools of law, the first ʿAbbāsid caliphs surrounded themselves with scholars and used 
qāḍīs to embellish the official facade of the state. Qāḍīs were used as advisors, witnesses, 
and emissaries. Caliphs also used them to conduct political trials, or to issue fatwās 
allowing the execution of political enemies. The political use of qāḍīs reached its peak 
during the miḥnah (“examination”), instituted at the end of the caliph al-Maʾmūn’s reign 
and lasting until the beginning of that of al-Mutawakkil (ca. 833–848). In an effort to 
restore his authority, which was being challenged by the traditionalist movement, the 
caliph sought to impose his control over the judicial system and through it impose his 
control over the whole Muslim community. He determined that only qāḍīs who adhered to 
the official theological dogma that the Qurʾān was a part of God’s creation were to remain 
in office, and they had to check that all witnesses (who usually belonged to the social and 
religious elite) professed the same dogma. 
Religious scholars in general and qāḍīs in particular argued increasingly against such 
manipulation of the judiciary. They disseminated prophetic reports (ḥadīths) insisting on 
the individual responsibility of the judge, who would be held responsible for his actions in 
the hereafter. They emphasized that the judge’s decision relied on scriptural sources—
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including the consensus (ijmāʿ) of jurists—or on his own assessment (ijtihād), and that left 
no place for caliphal intervention. During the ninth century, Ḥanafī jurists began to 
question the link between the caliph and his qāḍīs. According to the jurist al-Khaṣṣāf 
(d. 874), the qāḍī could issue a judgment against the caliph, despite his being a deputy of 
the latter. A century later, al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 981) asserted that the caliph did not appoint a judge 
in his own name but that the judge acted as a deputy for the whole community. The qāḍī 
served the Muslims (and not the caliph) on the basis of the law formulated by the legal 
scholars (fuqahāʾ). According to this theory, a qāḍī could be appointed by rebels 
(Khārijites), and even by the community itself in the absence of a ruler. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s theory 
was later adopted by other scholars, such as the Mālikī al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013). Although the 
caliphate recognized a greater independence of the qāḍīs after the end of the miḥnah and 
the victory of Sunnism under al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861), Muslim rulers never ceased in 
their attempts to manipulate the judiciary. 
 
Shiite Discourse on the Judiciary 
Imāmī Shiites, who believe that the only true rulers (imams, in Shiite discourse) were 
the fourth caliph, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (r. 656–661), and eleven of his descendants, regarded 
the Umayyads and the ʿAbbāsids as illegitimate rulers. According to al-Kulaynī (d. 940), 
the imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 765) forbade people to appeal to official qāḍīs. Instead, Shiite 
followers were advised to seek the judgment of a Shiite scholar, who would be considered 
a deputy of the true imam. The Imāmī doctrine evolved under the Būyid dynasty (945–
1055), which was of Shiite persuasion. According to al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067), an Imāmī Shiite 
appointed qāḍī by an illegitimate ruler could dispense justice as long as he remained 
faithful to his own doctrine and regarded himself as a deputy of the true imam. It was the 
duty of an Imāmī jurist to accept his appointment, lest an unjust (Sunnī) scholar be 
appointed qāḍī in his place. 
 
Parallel Judicial Institutions 
The administration of law was exercised in forums other than the Sharīʿah court, which 
allowed rulers to assert their judicial authority. Himself a source of judicial power, the 
ruler could preside over the litigations and give binding decisions, or he could appoint 
deputies who unlike qāḍīs were not bound by the rules of the Sharīʿah (even if these 
deputies could be Sharīʿah court judges at the same time). Often called “secular” justice 
because it took place outside the Sharīʿah court, it manifested itself in different ways. 
 
The Maẓālim Court 
The maẓālim (literally, “wrongs”) court symbolized the discretionary authority vested in 
the ruler. It had a broad jurisdiction—it received petitions against officials and abuse of 
power, and could occasionally serve as court of appeal against the qāḍīs’ judgments. The 
judge (theoretically the ruler, but more often his deputy) was usually assisted by jurists and 
qāḍīs, who guaranteed the legitimacy of the decision, as well as by clerks and witnesses. 
Procedure was not restricted by legal doctrine, however. Whereas the qāḍī was bound by 
the accusatory procedures formulated by the religious law and could not violate the 
evidentiary rules, the maẓālim judge had procedural powers that went beyond those—he 
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could use the inquisitorial method, order investigations, not wait for a case to be brought, 
and rely on noncanonical types of proof. The ruler could thus base his decision on 
principles of equity, or follow the dictates of the state rather than Sharīʿah law as such. 
Following the Sassanian model, maẓālim court sessions were probably organized on a 
regular basis during the early ʿAbbāsid period. Caliphs al-Mahdī and al-Hādī (r. 785–786) 
presided in person over a court. Later, the maẓālim were mostly supervised by the vizier, 
until the Shiite Būyids handed them to the Imāmī naqīb al-ashrāf (who ran the affairs of 
ʿAlī’s descendants). From the eleventh century on, the maẓālim court was characterized by 
increasing bureaucratization and placed under the responsibility of different officials 
(sultans, governors, military officers). No specific locale was reserved for these public 
sessions until Nūr al-Dīn Zankī (r. 1146–1174) established a “house of justice” (dār al-
ʿadl) in Damascus. A similar structure was built in Cairo under the Mamlūks. 
From the early ʿAbbāsid period on, the maẓālim competed with the qāḍīs’ jurisdiction, 
even though qāḍīs were occasionally appointed to head this court. ʿAbbāsid caliphs used 
the maẓālim forum to reinstate their authority when confronted with a qāḍī’s excessive 
autonomy or noncompliance with official ideology, as during the miḥnah. Through this 
institution, provincial governors seeking autonomy from the caliphate could also reinforce 
their power. In the late ninth century, when local dynasties first appeared in the east, 
provincial qāḍīs were still appointed by the caliph. Governors who sought autonomy had to 
regain control of the judiciary, but they could not easily dismiss a qāḍī dispensing justice 
in the name of the caliph. Rulers such as Ibn Ṭūlūn (r. 868–884), his son Khumārawayh 
(r. 884–896), and later the Ikhshīds (935–969) in Egypt therefore regularly used the 
maẓālim court as a way of bypassing the ordinary judicial system. Moreover, during the 
Mamlūk period, the maẓālim tended to encroach on matters regulated by the Sharīʿah, 
which fell under the jurisdiction of the qāḍī, such as cases involving pious foundations. 
The proliferation of centers of power after the eleventh century increased the 
importance of justice dispensed by rulers. Other courts, such as the yarghu of the Īl-Khān 
Mongols (1256–1335), which dealt specifically with disputes among Mongols as well as 
state affairs, were assimilated into the maẓālim when the dynasty converted to Islam.  
 
The Police  
The shurṭah (also called maʿūnah from the ninth century onward), was an elite unit of 
the army that served as a security and police force. It was established under the first caliphs 
or the early Umayyads to protect cities and villages against riots and banditry and to ensure 
the night watch. Its chief, the ṣāḥib al-shurṭah (also called shiḥnah after the end of the 
ninth century), was appointed by the caliph or the governor, and he was often the head of 
the ruler’s personal bodyguard. In early Islamic Egypt, the ṣāḥib al-shurṭah was the second 
highest official of the province after the governor, and he acted as his deputy when the 
latter was away. The shurṭah could be called upon to maintain order at the qāḍī’s court or 
to carry out his rulings. 
The shurṭah was not only a military unit with control and security functions. The ṣāḥib 
al-shurṭah also presided over a court where he dispensed criminal justice. Like the 
maẓālim, his court was not bound by the rules of the Sharīʿah, and the ṣāḥib al-shurṭah 
operated much more freely than the qāḍī. He could conduct investigations and rule on the 
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grounds of physical evidence. His discretionary powers allowed him to inflict punishments 
harsher than those prescribed by Islamic law. The ṣāḥib al-shurṭah probably judged 
criminals arrested and brought before him by his troops. He prosecuted on his own 
authority, without the necessity of a plaintiff.  
Finally, the ṣāḥib al-sūq or muḥtasib, chief of the “market police,” also heard 
complaints and dispensed justice. His principle task was the supervision of moral behavior 
in public. He intervened on his own accord and passed punitive judgment based on custom 
(ʿurf) against offenders. 
 
Summary  
In early Islam, the qāḍī was no more than a legal official under the ruler’s supreme 
judicial power. Between the eighth and the tenth centuries, as Islamic law developed into a 
specific field governed by legal scholars, the qāḍīs were increasingly identified with a 
religious jurisdiction that necessarily had to escape from under the authority of the ruler. 
Therefore, two sets of judicial institutions developed, which came to complement and 
sometimes compete with each other. For a ruler who needed to govern according to the 
public interest, to ensure security beyond the prescriptions of the Sharīʿah, or simply to 
serve state interests, it was necessary to rely on institutions that were not bound by the 
strict prescriptions of Islamic law and could be monitored more easily. During the Mamlūk 
period, authors such as Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 1350) 
attempted to repair the rupture between the two types of institutions by developing the 
concept of siyāsah sharʿīyah (governance in accordance with the sacred law). According to 
their theory, many practices of the extra-Sharīʿah institutions conformed to the spirit of 
Islamic law and could be justified on this ground; Sharīʿah legitimacy thus extended to 
actual states. Their theory would strongly influence the Ottoman legal system.  
The question of the boundaries between the various courts is still unresolved. Most 
scholars today think the qāḍī had little jurisdiction in penal law, although the Sharīʿah 
holds that the qāḍī has authority in criminal cases. As Émile Tyan remarked (Tyan, 1938-
1943, II, p. 411-2), procedural law limited the involvement of the qāḍī in criminal cases—
both a claimant and a defendant were required, and the judge could neither act on his own 
nor conduct inquiries. Most penal law cases were probably heard by the security forces 
(especially the police). Only on rare occasions, such as when a crime was witnessed and an 
accusation could be leveled, did the judge’s competence in criminal matters become a 
reality. As Christian Lange has argued (Lange, 2008, p. 48), the situation may be described 
as a network of overlapping jurisdictions, subject to variations according to era, place, and 
specific cases.  
 
 [See also Ḥisbah; Justice; and Sharīʿah.] 
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